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The post-cold war era presented security challenges that at one level are a continuation of the 
cold war era; at another level, these phenomena manifested in new forms. Whether the issues 
of economics and trade, transfer of technologies, challenges of intervention, or humanitarian 
crisis, the countries of the South (previously pejoratively labelled “Third World” or “developing” 
countries) have continued to address these challenges within the framework of their capabilities 
and concerns. The volume explores defence diplomacies, national security challenges and 
strategies, dynamics of diplomatic manoeuvers and strategic resource management of Latin 
American, southern African and Asian countries.
This path-breaking work is a fresh addition to the comparative literature on defence and security 
studies that links concepts and cases, giving voice to scholars related to the Global South and not 
to the Western powers. Emphasising history, political economy, the military, (human) security and 
politics, contributors to this innovative volume demonstrate ‘how the past reappears because 
it is a hidden present’, to paraphrase novelist Octavio Paz. A capita selecta of case studies and 
dialogue engendered thereby hold much promise for academic researchers, theorists, expert 
practitioners, security and political practitioners, policymakers and students. Apart from 
comparative potential, the analyses reflect a purposeful blend of theory, history and substance 
– indeed a worthy and valuable venture in current times. 
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South Africa’s Defence Diplomacy in Africa
Ian Liebenberg and Raymond Steenkamp-Fonseca
Abstract
South Africa’s defence posture in Africa changed radically between 1950 and 2018. From a garrison-minded state mired 
in diplomatic isolation, the country ‘returned to Africa’ following its negotiated transition to democracy. As South Africa’s 
relations on the continent evolve, so too does the country’s use of various instruments of foreign policy. This chapter primarily 
considers the military instrument in foreign policy, and in particular the country’s policy and practice of defence diplomacy. 
Shaped in part by the presidential styles of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, and Jacob Zuma, the interplay between foreign 
policy and defence has required South Africa to ensure it is not perceived as a hegemon by its neighbours in Africa, but as 
a declared partner – albeit often as the dominant partner. Even so, expectations continue that South Africa should extend 
its role in the African Union (AU), and through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) it helped to establish. As 
the chapter notes, significant gains have been made in advancing South African interests through defence diplomacy, but 
real limitations exist and these should be considered rationally before unrealistic demands or inflated expectations are 
uncritically accepted.
Introduction
Under apartheid policy (1948‑1994), the quest to impose internal control required a 
complementary external policy. South Africa’s defence posture therefore created an 
intolerant and aggressive power on the continent, and while confident of  its policies, 
the Pretoria regime fundamentally misjudged the evolving international setting. In the 
years to come, its actions were based on a fundamental strategic flaw, misreading both 
developments in and reasons for conflict in southern Africa – both within South Africa, 
and in the region. 
For decades, South Africa acted both as an exporter of  armed conflict and as an economic 
destabiliser in the region, particularly in the neighbouring frontline states (Ispahani, 1984). 
This was ultimately an untenable defence posture. The People’s Armed Forces of  Liberation 
of  Angola (FAPLA) and its Cuban allies forced the South African Defence Force (SADF) 
to a standstill in Angola, and eventual withdrawal from Angola and Namibia. Namibia 
became independent in March 1990 under United Nations (UN) Resolution 435, and in 
February 1990, the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan‑Africanist Congress (PAC), 
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and the South African Communist Party (SACP) were unbanned and restrictions were 
lifted on internal political organisations, such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) 
and the National Forum (NF). The negotiated transition that resulted in constitutional 
democracy in South Africa allowed the country to re‑enter world politics and the socio‑
politics and economy of  the African continent, as a potentially constructive actor and 
peace multiplier. With this transformation and demilitarisation of  security policies, a new 
posture saw South Africa framing its role as peacemaker and agent for change towards 
reconstruction, development, growth and, to an extent, democratisation. Thus, between 
1990 and 2000, South Africa arguably transformed from an imposing hegemon to a 
relatively benevolent partner on the continent. 
However, one should be cautious of  over‑simplifying this transformation. The dichoto‑
mous approach, understanding South Africa’s defence and foreign policy as neatly divided 
between the apartheid‑era and a post‑apartheid era, risks being too simplistic. The 
primary shortcoming is that by focusing on South Africa’s own political trajectory, this 
perspective does not adequately take into account the changing context of  African security 
and African development. Neither does it account fully for the rapidly changing macro‑
political international context. In order to appreciate South Africa’s defence diplomacy 
in Africa more completely, it is essential to consider public policy as having an internal 
trajectory as well as being a response to changes in the regional and international political 
and security environment. We begin in the next section by setting out the historical 
context, using the example of  South Africa’s involvement in Namibia and Angola, and 
the use of  the military instrument in foreign policy. The subsequent section looks at the 
transition to a democratic dispensation and explains the broader policy context under the 
1996 Constitution. The discussion is structured around the country’s Foreign and Defence 
policy under the Mandela, Mbeki, and Zuma presidencies, in terms of  their principles, 
policy formulation, and implementation.
It is within the wider spectrum of  policy choices in the deployment of  soft power that 
the concept of  peace diplomacy becomes relevant. Peace diplomacy is not a frequently‑
used concept, despite the use of  ‘peace’ and ‘diplomacy’ as central to the study of  inter‑
national relations (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012), and one may also choose to refer to conflict 
management (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). Our use of  the term follows closely that of  Van 
Nieuwkerk, where peace diplomacy refers to ‘the activities associated with peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding’ and thus in the South African case, as the government’s 
‘involvement in continental peacemaking (diplomatic interventions in the form of 
mediation or negotiation processes), United Nations mandated peacekeeping operations 
(also known as multidimensional peace support) and peacebuilding (in line with the AU 
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framework for post‑conflict reconstruction and development)’ (2012:84). It is important 
to note that multiactor coalitions and policy implementation entities are involved (Van 
Nieuwkerk, 2012). 
The remainder of  the chapter looks at SA defence policy, and structural and organisational 
changes since 1994; the principles on defence engagement through multilateral institutions 
like the UN, the AU, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC); 
bilateral relations with countries with whom defence agreements have been signed on 
training, VIP protection, joint operations, or peace missions; South Africa’s role in the 
region, including its involvement in (southern) African peacekeeping; South Africa’s role 
in the African Standby Force and the African Command, and the relationship with the 
current APSA; and South Africa’s defence policy and the challenges of  defence diplomacy 
in the medium term.
From apartheid to transition and transformation
From being a well‑regarded actor on the international stage under the rule of  Field‑
Marshall Jan Christiaan Smuts, South Africa’s image deteriorated after the electoral 
victory of  the National Party in 1948. Apartheid policies were implemented at all levels 
of  society, based on a system of  racial discrimination which was underpinned by racial 
classification, largely benefiting the white population. Black South Africans had no voting 
rights, and hence no right to citizenship, and the voting rights of  so‑called coloured people 
were scrapped. The policy of  apartheid, including rigid racial separation, the withholding 
of  full citizenship rights, discrimination, and the displacement of  the internal population 
along racial lines, was coupled with increasing repression, particularly from 1963. This 
repression was first carried out by the police and later by military structures, enforcing the 
whites‑only minority regime and resulting in the militarisation of  state and society. Thus, 
the apartheid system and its grave social injustices was clearly a form of  structural (state) 
violence imposed in an authoritarian way. 
Initially, Pretoria sided with the (perceived Christian) West and the capitalist states. Aligned 
with the Allied Forces during World War II, South Africa participated in the ‘Berlin Lift’, 
the air‑relief  operation in Germany (1948‑1949), and in the UN‑mandated multinational 
operation in the Korean peninsula from 1950. Though nominally supported as a bulwark 
against Communist expansion in southern Africa, South Africa’s political stance was 
increasingly questioned at the UN. South Africa had argued from the start that its 
government policies fell within the country’s domestic jurisdiction, and as a sovereign 
state, it need not subject itself  and its domestic affairs to international scrutiny. However, 
this defence proved baseless and apartheid was labelled as a crime against humanity by 
General Assembly Resolution 2202  A  (XXI) of  16 December 1966. Strong opposition to 
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apartheid came from most of  the developing countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, 
and Latin America. Even in Europe, voices of  protest rose, starting in the East European 
countries and social‑democratic states such as the Scandinavian countries, and eventually 
from some members of  the Security Council (Pampallis, 1991:278). Sanctions were 
to become a large part of  the anti‑apartheid struggle. On the African continent, the 
Organization of  African Unity (OAU) helped bolster a broader ‘Third World’ voice 
through the Non‑Aligned Movement (NAM) bloc within the UN General Assembly. In the 
face of  an international anti‑apartheid movement, and especially from the 1970s onwards, 
South Africa’s defence posture was driven by a siege mentality. The dominant ideology 
of  the political leadership was that of  a garrison state, perceiving itself  to be under a 
‘total onslaught’ from Soviet/Chinese Communism, a hostile Africa (through which 
the disconcerting winds of  change of  independence were blowing), and an increasingly 
unappreciative West.
One can draw parallels between South Africa’s internal and external policies. Internally, 
the government used strong‑arm tactics and ignored the feelings of  the majority of  South 
Africans. Externally, this was mirrored in the government’s disregard of  international 
criticism, including criticisms voiced at the General Assembly. ‘South Africa [provided] 
a dramatic illustration of  the internationalisation of  a domestic situation’ (Pampallis, 
1991:205). Heavy‑handed domestic policies and repressive actions inside the country 
reflected a diplomatic but hard‑fisted foreign and defence policy. Pretoria’s policies led 
South Africa to international pariah status, aptly described as ‘diplomacy of  isolation’ 
(Geldenhuys, 1984). 
Namibia
South Africa’s treatment of  the Namibian people should be considered alongside its 
domestic record of  repression. Mandated after World War I by the League of  Nations 
to protect German West Africa (later South West Africa – SWA), neither the Smuts 
government nor the apartheid government saw fit to withdraw from Namibia. The South 
African political elite and their followers started referring to Namibia (still called SWA) 
as South Africa’s ‘fifth province’, but in spite of  this, the Namibian people persevered 
in their attempts at independence, combating superior armed forces from South 
Africa who believed SWA was rightfully theirs (UN, 1974). In this, the Namibians, and 
specifically the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), were supported in 
their international efforts by persistent objections at the UN from India, Liberia, Mexico, 
and numerous others that joined the call for Namibians to choose their own destiny, an 
opportunity denied them ever since the brutal German colonial occupation during the 
1880s (Liebenberg, 2015:17‑34, 2018:16).
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As in South Africa, territorial segregation between ‘ethnic’ groups was envisaged and South 
African legislation, including security laws, was applied in the territory (Seegers, 1996:135). 
The Odendaal Commission (1962‑1964) made it clear that ‘a policy of  differentiation must 
be followed’ and ‘ethnic groups are basic units of  development’ (Seegers, 1996:22‑24). In 
the eyes of  many, this was a clear attempt to structure Namibia along apartheid lines. This 
all took place despite the visit to Namibia by a UN Special Committee for South West 
Africa, to which Pretoria reluctantly agreed. Members of  the Committee pointed out that 
the Pretoria government was intent on the subordination of  the people of  Namibia to 
their own likes. Pretoria obstinately forged ahead (Seegers, 1996:21) and requests to solve 
the tensions around segregationist policies and the issue of  Namibia fell on deaf  ears 
(Frankel, 1984:278, 279; Pampallis, 1991:278; Geldenhuys, 1984:205). Despite resistance 
and protest, Namibia’s status remained that of  a mandate (UN, 1974). In 1961, the UN 
General Assembly asked for collective action against South Africa, and by November 1962 
the Assembly called for specific diplomatic and economic sanctions against the apartheid 
government (Geldenhuys, 1984:206). 
For a brief  period in 1966, South Africa’s mandate over Namibia seemed confirmed when 
the International Court of  Justice (ICJ) ruled that Liberia and Ethiopia did not have any 
legal rights or interest in the matter of  SWA. In a way, many Namibians felt that their long 
struggle for self‑determination since the 1880s had been betrayed by this ruling, and it 
affirmed their need to pursue an armed struggle. In response, South African authorities 
introduced emergency regulations, security operations, and detentions, while maintaining 
its position in the face of  international criticism. The UN Security Council revoked South 
Africa’s mandate in Namibia, and by 1971, the ICJ re‑affirmed that South Africa’s occupation 
of  Namibia was in contravention of  international law. In his special report for 1973, the 
Secretary‑General of  the UN, Kurt Waldheim, emphasised the ‘special responsibilities 
of  the international community towards the Territory and the people of  Namibia’, and 
urged the UN organs, and the Security Council in particular, ‘to seek effective approaches 
to bring about a solution based on the inalienable rights of  the Namibian people to self‑
determination, national independence, and the preservation of  the unity and territorial 
integrity of  Namibia’ (Geldenhuys, 1984:42).
Following a Resolution by the UN General Assembly, governments from Scandinavia, 
Eastern Europe, the NAM, and other countries recognised SWAPO as Namibia’s sole 
representative (Geldenhuys, 1984:14ff.; Du Pisani, 1986:6ff.). When the UN adopted 
Resolution 435 in 1978, the so‑called Western Five – the US, UK, West Germany, Canada, 
and France – temporarily agreed that Namibia should be granted independence and that a 
UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was to assist in ensuring free and fair elections. 
However, covert support to South Africa continued, notably from the US, UK and France 
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(Stockwell, 1978:272‑273; Jaster, 1985:92, 114; Namibia Support Committee, 1988:698‑701; 
Liebenberg, 2011:72‑73).
Angola 
South Africa invaded Angola in 1975 to bolster the ‘anti‑communist’ forces amongst the 
rebel movements. After the coup in Portugal against the Caetano government in 1974, 
three liberation movements in Angola vied for power, but only one was a legitimate 
liberation movement: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of  Angola (MPLA). The 
Union for the Total Liberation of  Angola (UNITA) was implicated in earlier dealings 
with Portuguese security forces, while the leader of  the third, the National Front for the 
Liberation of  Angola (FNLA), was hardly on Angolan soil, having chosen Kinshasa in Zaire 
as his headquarters, and was in the pay of  the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In 
contrast, the MPLA had significant support in urban areas, including trade unions, and since 
1954 had demonstrated its ability to mobilise in towns and the countryside, and to fight 
and survive in the field, despite setbacks (Liebenberg, 2008:66‑68). South Africa’s support 
for Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA, and supply of  hardware and advisors to Holden Roberto’s 
FNLA guerrillas, escalated the regional cycle of  violence, and both Namibia and Angola 
were to suffer for decades from the destabilising conflicts that they experienced. Even 
if  they had combined their resources, the frontline states could not match the military 
power of  South Africa, as the consistent build‑up of  South African forces led to an arms 
race in southern Africa. South Africa’s aggressive posture forced the frontline states to 
spend money on arms, rather than much‑needed development, all while South Africa 
deliberately destabilised the frontline states through punitive economic steps.
In summary, as the examples of  Namibia and Angola show, South Africa’s isolation forged 
a unilateral foreign policy to ensure regional hegemony. This ‘total strategy’ led to the 
country’s militarisation, and the destabilisation of  its neighbours. The primacy of  the 
military as an instrument of  foreign policy saw the SADF engaging in cross‑border conflict 
and a geopolitics of  war, in the face of  pressure from the international community.
A new era dawns
South Africa’s negotiated transition (1990‑1996) marked a significant advance in the 
country’s political development, and a clear break in how it sees and is seen by its 
neighbours. The anti‑apartheid struggle was an international one, and South Africa was 
subsequently welcomed into a new world that, at least temporarily, had left behind the 
bipolar Cold War schisms (Dyer, 2009:186, 198). 
As South Africa returned to the international community, there was a wide range of 
international actors with whom to interact, and the country engaged broadly with other 
nations and continents through both bilateral and multilateral agreements. However, it 
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is clear that, rather than being swayed to join a specific power bloc, South Africa could 
act from its position as an emerging middle power. For example, South Africa returned 
to the British Commonwealth, yet was also a leader of  the NAM; it deepened relations 
with European countries, the EU, and with the US (particularly under Clinton), but 
simultaneously further enhanced long‑standing connections with Libya and Cuba, and 
acted independently in its relations with countries like China, India, and Iran. Van Wyk 
argues that ‘South African scholars predominantly evaluated the Mandela presidency 
as a period of  (new) foreign policy‑making, the establishment of  new relations and the 
continuation of  old relations’ (2012:277). South Africa thus was able to forge a balanced 
stance, arguably based on moral principles, yet asserting that the new democracy also 
identified its own interests.
South Africa developed a new diplomatic orientation and stepped out of  its self‑declared 
alliance with the West and close association with military regimes in Latin America and 
aggressive pariah states such as Israel, preferring a ‘foreign policy of  peace’ and multilateral 
international participation and engagement. South Africa demonstrated its solidarity with 
the developing world and became a member of  the NAM, as well as being involved with 
what was to become the AU, initiating the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), despite initial differences on 
how to unify Africa and on what economic pathway to follow to ensure sustainability and 
stability. Within the southern Africa subregion, South Africa entered the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the precursor to SADC. Thus, South 
Africa moved from a destabiliser to a cordial beneficiary and partner in solidarity on the 
continent, at least in the new political elite’s view. Recognised as a regional economic core 
and possessing a relatively strong military, this leadership role seemed a natural position, 
but the challenge was how to be a benevolent partner, rather than a selfish hegemon. 
Any hegemonic enterprise reminiscent of  apartheid power policy would rightly invite 
scepticism from other African states.
South Africa’s policy context 
Partly as a result of  the Cold War, there was extensive armed conflict on the African 
continent during the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The year 1991 also saw widespread conflict, 
both globally and on the African continent, but Cilliers (2014) observed that this was 
followed by a steep decline in conflict occurrence, which reached low levels from 2002 
to 2005. However, since 2009 there has been a rise in armed conflicts, especially in Africa, 
partly because of  the so‑called War on Terror and intervention by Western core states 
(Cilliers, 2014).
For South Africa, the end of  the Cold War required an adjustment of  foreign policy within 
a changed international environment, from one based on Cold War rivalry to a post‑
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Cold War global order. This international context provides a necessary but incomplete 
understanding of  the setting of  South Africa’s foreign policy, which requires consideration 
of  the context of  South Africa’s transition, which we will address below.
Foreign policy
The new South Africa’s foreign policy and diplomacy closely echoed its expressed domestic 
values. Achievements in the domestic domain, such as being able to successfully find a 
negotiated resolution to long‑standing conflict and formalise a commitment to peace, 
reconciliation, and democratisation of  state and society, understandably shaped how the 
country saw itself  internationally. The new Constitution (Act 108 of  1996), based on a Bill 
of  Rights and principled constitutionalism, envisaged a democratic non‑racial society that 
focused on peace and conflict resolution internally and externally. Van Nieuwkerk argues 
that ‘the link between foreign policy and peace diplomacy (as an instrument of  foreign 
policy)’ created the image of  South African presidents, especially Mandela and Mbeki, ‘as 
foreign policy actors and peacemakers’ (Van Wyk, 2012:277). This approach saw a shift 
from hard power to soft power, entailing an opportunity for defence diplomacy.
This domestic context can be seen in the light of  the personalities of  the leaders who made 
the democratic transition possible. Under presidents Mandela and Mbeki (1994 to 2008), 
South Africa’s experience of  resolving national conflict through negotiation strongly 
influenced the formulation of  foreign and defence policies shaped by a commitment to 
values, and not just interests. With their global presence, these leaders were influential 
in carrying out foreign policy themselves, perhaps under‑utilising their foreign ministers, 
and ultimately failing to ensure the development of  diplomatic expertise at the depart‑
mental level. 
Under presidents Mandela and Mbeki, South Africa embarked on a range of  bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, diplomatic, political, economic and cultural, with SADC, the rest 
of  Africa, and countries on other continents. Foreign policy under these presidents was 
consistent with attempts to: (1) advocate South Africa’s negotiated transition as a model 
of  conflict resolution; (2) stress South Africa’s commitment to the region and the African 
continent; (3) affirm South Africa’s relationships with past supporting nations outside of 
and including the NAM (i.e. Russia, Cuba, Libya), and with friendly nations on the European 
continent such as the Scandinavian countries and The Netherlands; and (4) re‑orientate 
South African engagement with states outside South Africa’s normal ambit, such as Brazil, 
China, Iran, and others. The foreign policy approach also demonstrated that South Africa 
was ready and willing to work with Western core economies such as Germany, the UK, 
and the US, and subsequent bilateral agreements testified to this. However, despite the 
diplomatic projection reflecting re‑alignment with Africa, affirmation of  old friendships 
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and a willingness to act as peacemaker on and off  the African continent, foreign policy 
under Nelson Mandela to an extent remained ad hoc. Some would even argue that it 
was greatly reliant on Mandela as president, his international profile, personal actions, 
and preferences.
When Thabo Mbeki assumed the presidency, foreign policy was still thoroughly influenced 
by the executive branch of  government, and it has been argued that under Mbeki, the role 
of  Parliament diminished (Van Wyk, 2012:279). Along with this, the Mbeki administration 
organised government functions into ‘clusters’, as coordinating mechanisms of  integrated 
governance (Alden & Le Pere, 2004). This applied at cabinet ministerial level (policy), but 
also at the Director‑General level (implementation), and foreign policy and defence policy 
are considered together within the International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS) 
Cluster. The cluster included the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the 
externally‑directed intelligence agency (the SASS), and Foreign Affairs who led the work 
of  policy formulation and implementation (Africa, 2011). The cluster approach underlines 
the primacy of  political action through diplomatic channels, and the necessity to engage 
peaceful instruments of  foreign policy before considering military engagement.
Mbeki’s vision of  an African Renaissance saw South Africa push for the AU, for its economic 
programme NEPAD, and for internal accountability through the APRM. Although not 
everyone accepted Mbeki’s views on the future continental strategy, especially in the 
economic realm, South Africa pushed for greater regional integration between West, East 
and Southern Africa (Ngwenya, 2012) with the AU as the foundation stone for continental 
cooperation and, perhaps, closer integration. 
Under Jacob Zuma, the Department of  Foreign Affairs (DFA) was renamed the 
Department of  International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) to help enhance ‘public 
diplomacy’ and ‘facilitate domestic constituency engagement’. There was a shift from 
conflict resolution to economic diplomacy (Vickers, 2012), which was emphasised in 2011 
in the Draft White Paper on Foreign Policy (Masters, 2012:27‑28). 
Soft power 
South Africa sought to internationalise itself  with a new more inclusive approach, 
presenting principled aptitude to furthering peace, reconstruction, and development. The 
promotion of  human rights, derived from the experience of  apartheid and the attainment 
of  a liberal constitution, played an important role in the early years of  South Africa’s foreign 
policy orientation (Masters, 2012:145; Neethling, 2012:479‑482), and some observers argue 
that soft power from 1994 until 2012 was the very essence of  South Africa’s foreign policy 
(Smith, 2012:69). The use of  soft power stems partially from South Africa’s value‑laden 
approach (involving conflict prevention, conflict resolution, preference for negotiation, 
I. Liebenberg, D. Kruijt & S. Paranjpe (eds). 2020. Defence Diplomacy and National Security Strategy. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media.
https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928480556/06 Copyright 2020 African Sun Media and the authors
110 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
and democratisation) and partially from the realisation of  the limits of  their economic 
and military power. In reality, there are limits to what a middle power such as South Africa 
can do, despite its relative strength in a region (Hughes, 2001).
South Africa embraced multilateralism as a way to solve diplomatic challenges, and its 
foreign policy emphasises the importance of  working through multilateral institutions. 
Ten years after independence, Nathan (2005) summarised that, ‘South Africa promotes 
multilateralism in the international system as the best means of  maintaining global order, 
addressing global problems, mitigating the domination and unilateralism of  powerful 
states, and empowering weaker countries.’ However, more than just participating in 
international institutions, the idea was to actively promote a reformist programme in 
these institutions (Alden, 2014). ‘South Africa embraced multilateralism as an approach 
to solving the challenges confronting the international community … it took up a leading 
role in various multilateral forums’ (Monyae, 2012:139). South Africa promoted peace 
and security with a definite emphasis on Africa and developing nations in general, and 
attempts were also made to improve interaction with, and cooperation between, the UN 
Security Council and others (Monyae, 2012). Some even talked about these activities as 
an ‘evolving doctrine of  multilateralism’ by South Africa, as a ‘realist middle power’ and a 
‘pluralist middle power’ (Monyae, 2012:139, 141, 142). 
South Africa entered African politics as a regional power on the continent and an aspiring 
middle power internationally (Hughes, 2001), and it changed from regional hegemon 
to benevolent partner – at least in terms of  its discourse. However, there were on one 
side those who advocated a stronger role, and on the other side those who dreaded such 
a possibility. 
Defence policy
The South African Constitution (Act 108 of  1996), the White Paper on Defence (May 
1996) subtitled ‘Defence in a Democracy’, and the Defence Review (April 1998), and 
the Defence Act (Act No. 42 of  2002) collectively set the direction of  the Department of 
Defence (today the Department of  Defence and Military Veterans, DOD) and the SANDF. 
Though the main issues were the transition to democracy and the transformation of 
the DOD, the White Paper also set out a foreign policy and defence posture based on 
a principled preparedness to engage constructively with states in the region. The policy 
foresaw armed forces with a primarily defensive orientation, and thus envisaged a change 
from animosity to friendship with South Africa’s neighbours. The process of  publishing 
‘Defence in a Democracy’ can itself  be seen as a necessary change from the past, as it 
was a relatively transparent and inclusive process, with extensive domestic consultation 
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across Ministries and other government departments, but also with academic experts and 
broader civil society (Africa, 2011). The second Defence Review was less inclusive, but did 
not deviate much from its predecessor in terms of  defence posture, force projection, and 
South Africa’s role in Africa with regards to peacekeeping operations. The latest defence 
review also raised some concerns, such as the need to rejuvenate the SANDF and to update 
and replace obsolete equipment, including the need for modernised aerial troop transport, 
and a highly-educated officer’s corps. Ignoring these issues may impact on South Africa’s 
obligations and defence diplomacy, but so far very little has been done by the DOD to 
implement their obligations in terms of  the 2015 Defence Review.
A clear philosophy was reflected of  constructive involvement in preventive diplomacy, 
peacebuilding, peacemaking, development based on pro-active resolution of  conflict, and 
moral leadership. Peace Missions were defined as including ‘participation in Preventative 
Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping Operations, Peace Enforcement, Peace Building, 
Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian Intervention’ (Department of  Government 
Communications and Information Systems (GCIS), 2003). South African policy also 
reflects the change in how international peacekeeping is carried out under UN mandates, 
in particular the increased attention of  Peace Support Operations (PSO) on post-conflict 
reconstruction, security sector reform, and humanitarian assistance (GCIS, 2003). On 
paper, this orientation is consistent with a foreign policy based on liberal humanitarian 
principles. 
However, if  South Africa expected to play a larger role in regional stability and 
international peace missions, then the SANDF force structure and modernisation plans 
needed to accommodate this new role. Granted, the primary role of  the armed forces 
remains defence of  the homeland, but even as a secondary mission, external deployment 
to enhance regional stability requires proper training, preparation, and equipment. It is 
in this light that one must understand the arms acquisition process, or Strategic Defence 
Procurement (SDP), commonly referred to in South Africa as the Arms Deal, announced 
in September 1999. The acquisition of  submarines, frigates, helicopters, fighter jets, and 
training aircraft for the air force and the navy indicate an orientation towards traditional 
conventional threats, contradicting the stated defensive posture of  the SANDF, and 
contributing little to South Africa’s peacekeeping role on the continent. The exclusion 
of  any significant procurement for the army at the time highlighted these contradictions, 
and still raises questions about operational readiness. Moreover, investigations into the 
irregularities of  the Arms Deal, which led to charges of  corruption against members 
of  parliament and the executive, including Jacob Zuma, significantly eroded the public 
perception that the military could be trusted by broader civil society. Put another way, the 
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fallout from the Arms Deal controversy and corruption has prevented a clear picture of 
anything good being done by the civilian and military leadership, resulting in an increasing 
civil‑military relations gap.
South Africa’s defence policy should be understood in its multilateral policy context, and 
specifically the regional dimension, through the common security arrangements for the 
SADC region. ‘South Africa has not flinched from active engagement, both within its own 
region and on the global stage’ and this against a background of  high expectations from 
the international community about [South Africa’s] role’ (Sidiropoulos, 2007:1; DOD, 2009). 
Within SADC, South Africa aimed at a new security orientation, and seemingly committed 
itself  to future conflict resolution, mediation, and conflict management through the 
creation of  the SADC Organ on Peace, Defence and Security Cooperation. The SADC 
Organ has a strong security mandate, as it is endowed in Article 2 of  the Protocol with the 
power to ‘consider enforcement action’ as a last resort to prevent, contain, resolve inter‑ 
and intra‑state conflict (Hammerstad, 2005). In theory, SADC has power to intervene in the 
domestic affairs of  member states, but this has not been the case in practice. The discourse 
on regional security in SADC arguably hinged on differing interpretations: Zimbabwe, 
Angola and Namibia preferred a mutual defence pact with a military response to conflict, 
while the camp led by South Africa preferred a common security regime based on conflict 
resolution and political solutions (Nathan, 2005:42). The SADC Standby Brigade, as part 
of  the AU’s African Standby Force, can be seen as an effort driven by South Africa to create 
coherence between the subregional and continental security architecture.
The Future SA Army Strategy (Strategy 2020) was released in 2009 and includes reference 
to the army’s role in peacekeeping and peace enforcement on the continent. The primary 
role, constitutionally defined, remains protection of  national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, but there was recognition from army planners that peacekeeping operations 
will dominate in the future (Baker, 2009:12). The Defence Review 2015 indicates the 
broader role of  the SANDF within a developmental state, and re‑affirms South Africa’s 
African focus and its role in post‑conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD), while 
the country’s role in ‘regional and continental processes to respond and resolve crises’ is 
stressed (Neethling, 2012:474‑479). Some theorists saw the Draft Defence Review 2012 
as a positive development, ‘given the demands placed on the SANDF in the field of  post‑
conflict reconstruction and development’ (Neethling 2012:472), arguing that this may 
impact positively on the evolution of  developmental peacekeeping. Most recently, the 
Minister of  Defence formulated a Directive on ‘Execution of  Defence Diplomacy Policy 
in the DOD’. The challenge, as revealed in the Annual Report 2016/17, is that there needs 
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to be synchronisation between the Ministers’ Directive and the DIRCO policy, as set out 
in ‘Anchor State Document on Defence International Engagements’ (DOD, 2017).
This policy background therefore demonstrates the gap between acquisitions and the 
conceivable external deployment missions of  the SANDF. Some illustrative examples will 
be useful, and the chosen cases are Lesotho, Burundi, Democratic Republic of  Congo 
(DRC), Sudan, and Central African Republic (CAR), each demonstrating a particular 
aspect of  South Africa’s use of  the military as defence diplomacy in Africa. First, it is 
necessary to briefly consider the range of  bilateral agreements on defence issues.
Defence diplomacy engagement
Defence dialogue and cooperation are inherent in defence diplomacy arrangements, and 
aim to avert misunderstandings and ease mistrust by promoting transparency. In practical 
terms, this can be done through exchange of  defence attachés, and exchange of  information 
on a number of  topics, such as defence budgets, force structure, modernisation plans, 
and deployments. A second feature of  defence diplomacy is establishing bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, as well as participating in multinational organisations, such as 
the UN, the AU and SADC (especially in the Interstate Defence and Security Committee) 
(GCIS, 2017). Bilateral defence diplomacy and cooperation take place at a number of 
political levels and institutions, although as Blake reveals, there is a dearth of  information 
on South Africa’s defence cooperation generally, and his position as a military practitioner 
means his study provides useful insights (2016). At a deeper level of  connection, states may 
participate in military education and joint military exercises. Following the framework of 
Cottey and Forster (2004), defence diplomacy engagement can be divided into a number 
of  areas of  activity:
High-level political ties: The Bi‑National Commission (BNC) is a forum for dialogue 
at the presidential level. The BNC is usually chaired by the South African President, and 
includes the Minister of  Defence and Department officials. In contrast, a Joint Commission 
on Cooperation ( JCC) is chaired by the Minister of  DIRCO, but usually includes other 
government ministers, including the Defence Minister, and other senior officials. The 
Minister of  Defence chairs meetings at the Joint Permanent Commission on Defence 
and Security ( JPCDS), which are annual bilateral meetings with representatives of  states 
contiguous to South Africa. At the level of  Secretary for Defence (equivalent to a Director‑
General), meetings are held as a Defence Committee (DC) with senior departmental 
officials in attendance (Blake, 2016).
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Military-to-military contacts: As set out in the Defence Review 2014, the relationship 
with other armed forces is carried out through a DOD Foreign Relations Strategy. Defence 
International Affairs (DIA) formulates and provides policy advice on Defence Foreign 
Relations, which administers support to the SANDF defence attaché offices abroad and to 
foreign military dignitaries (DOD, 2015).
TABLE 6.1 SA defence diplomacy involving SADC states (2011‑15)
SA defence diplomacy involving SADC states (2011‑15) Total
Defence dialogue:
  Bilateral meetings










  Anti-Piracy Operations
  HADR
  Border Liaison Forums











SOURCE: Developed from Blake (2016)
Defence diplomacy in South Africa’s continental peacekeeping 
operations
Lesotho
South Africa moved beyond its stated preference for diplomatic conflict resolution with its 
first foreign deployment of  the military to Lesotho in 1998. The post‑election constitutional 
crisis in that country resulted in Prime Minister Mosisili requesting assistance to prevent 
a possible coup. Peaceful diplomatic solutions had been tried, including through the 
SADC Troika, but Mandela’s preventive diplomacy efforts and calls for constitutional 
reform were not sufficient to avoid the crisis following the disputed general election 
of  April 1998. The crisis was compounded by members of  the Lesotho Defence Force 
(LDF) staging a mutiny in September 1998, and an increase in civil disorder and public 
violence which led to internal instability. The SANDF deployed under Operation Boleas 
to prevent an unconstitutional take‑over of  power and secure law and order, a military 
action that Du Plessis called the ‘intrusive use of  the military instrument in the form of 
military intervention’ (2003:130). South Africa maintained that it was a peace operation 
under a SADC mandate and not an invasion, as the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) had 
been involved.
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The issue remains whether South Africa gave up on negotiating a political settlement too 
quickly, deploying the military without a full understanding of  how the enforcement 
action would be viewed. There were also questions about the requirements for regarding 
a military response as a SADC response since, as Neethling points out, there were no clear 
guidelines from SADC regarding military responses in internal conflicts (2012). At the 
time of  Mosisili’s request, the SADC Chair and the president of  South Africa were the 
same person (Likoti, 2007). Moreover, South Africa had not participated in the August 
1998 intervention operation in the DRC after requests from President Laurent Kabila for 
military assistance, while Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia did intervene. In both Lesotho 
and the DRC, regional security cooperation under the SADC banner in intrastate conflict 
proved controversial. From an international perspective, De Coning argues that, ‘South 
Africa, Botswana and SADC, appeared to have failed to obtain prior authorization from 
the UN Security Council as required by Chapter VIII of  the Charter’ (1998:22), while 
others hold that, although there is debate about the strict legality of  the operation, South 
Africa’s actions were legitimate (Southall, 2006:7). Nevertheless, South Africa was aware 
that acting unilaterally could be interpreted as hegemonic dominance, and leading up to 
the 2002 election, they continued to engage Lesotho via SADC.
Burundi
The Burundi intervention can be seen as one of  South Africa’s most successful uses of 
the military in foreign policy in support of  diplomatic negotiation and peacemaking (Du 
Plessis, 2003:126; Southall, 2006:12). Nelson Mandela became involved as the key peace 
mediator in the OAU peace process after the death of  Julius Nyerere in 1999 although, 
as Van Eck notes, Nyerere’s facilitation was flawed as two Burundian political‑military 
movements had been excluded (Van Eck, 2009:168‑170). Mandela’s diplomatic efforts 
resulted in the Arusha Agreement of  Peace and Reconciliation of  August 2000, the basis 
of  which was a three‑year transitional government based on power‑sharing between Tutsi‑ 
and Hutu‑dominated political parties. 
Given the resistance from the excluded armed movements, the peace process required 
ongoing ceasefire negotiations, and South Africa was prepared to back up its diplomatic 
efforts with a military presence. With Jacob Zuma, then the country’s deputy president, 
taking the lead, South African negotiations resulted in armed groups, political parties, 
and regional neighbours maintaining a fragile peace. South Africa deployed a military 
force to Burundi in support of  the Arusha Peace Agreement, facilitating the return of 
exiled political leaders and providing protection to those participating in the Burundi 
Transitional Government. The military deployment of  the South African Protection and 
Support Detachment (SAPSD) was referred to as Operation Fibre, a protective military 
deployment in the context of  a negotiated settlement.
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There was also a multilateral track to South Africa’s involvement, as the Department of 
Foreign Affairs had approached the UN for assistance in gaining international support 
for the deployment (Makwetla, 2012). This support was confirmed in Security Council 
Resolution 1375 (20 October 2001) which ‘Endorses the efforts of  the Government of  South 
Africa and other member States to support the implementation of  the Arusha Agreement, 
and strongly supports in this regard the establishment of  an interim multinational security 
presence in Burundi, at the request of  its Government, to protect returning political 
leaders and train an all‑Burundian protection force.’ 
Along with this, South Africa also worked through the newly created AU. The AU Mission 
in Burundi (AMIB), established in May 2003 as the first AU peacekeeping mission, had 
a South African as its first Force Commander, and South Africa participated alongside 
Ethiopia and Mozambique as the major military contributors. It must be pointed out 
that South Africa had an authoritative role in the creation of  the AU, and that a number 
of  initiatives regarding the deployment of  the mission were carried out by President 
Thabo Mbeki in his capacity as AU chairperson (Landsberg, 2012). South Africa also 
continued to play a major role in Burundi when the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) 
was established in June 2004. South African Major General Derrick Mgwebi was the first 
ONUB Force Commander, a first for a South African in an international peacekeeping 
force (Makwetla, 2012).
Democratic Republic of the Congo
The DRC case presents a range of  examples of  South Africa’s use of  the military instrument. 
As noted above, in contrast with South Africa’s more pacific approach within SADC, the 
trio of  Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia pursued a militarist line. This resulted in their 
participation in the hostilities in the DRC, and consequently to a cleavage on this issue in 
SADC and antagonism between SADC states. Nevertheless, the diplomatic initiatives of 
Thabo Mbeki between 1999 and 2002 promised political stability to the DRC and resulted 
in the signing of  the Lusaka Peace Agreement in July 1999. This paved the way for the 
establishment of  the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo 
(MONUC), and diplomatic efforts were bolstered by the deployment of  the SANDF as 
part of  the internationally‑mandated mission. South Africa’s participation in MONUC 
from September 1999 was code‑named Operation Mistral.
South Africa’s multilateral participation in MONUC increased, particularly after the 
assassination of  President Laurent Kabila in January 2001 placed renewed pressure on 
the UN to expedite the implementation of  MONUC. The UN allocated a number of  staff 
officer posts to South Africa, and SANDF personnel were deployed for 12 months. South 
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Africa was also requested to deploy its specialist elements, the South African National 
Defence Force Specialist Contingent (SANDFSPECC), as well as the SANDF Aero Medical 
Evacuation team. South African Military Police members were also deployed to establish 
the MONUC Military Police Unit, and in July 2002, the UN DPKO requested that South 
Africa deploy a Task Force to MONUC.
South Africa entered into the DRC with bilateral or trilateral defence diplomacy agree‑
ments. South Africa had signed an agreement with the DRC and Belgium to support 
security sector reform in respect of  the DRCs Armed Forces (FARDC). This deployment 
of  the South African Detachment Assisting with Integration and Training (SADAIT) in 
the DRC from January 2005 was named Operation Teutonic, and its primary role was 
to provide assistance with the identification and registration process. This was expanded 
later in 2005 (Teutonic II) with the deployment of  additional personnel to the Eastern 
DRC to facilitate with training centres.
The situation in the DRC continues to evolve. In July 2010, the UN mission received a 
new mandate and was renamed the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission 
in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo (MONUSCO). The SANDF presence in the 
DRC in support of  MONUSCO consisted of  three military observers, 12 staff  officers, 
and a contingent of  1200 members. In 2014, a new mandate was decided by UN Security 
Council Resolution 2098, which saw South Africa deploying a battalion as part of  the 
MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade.
Sudan
The Sudan example sheds light on the deployment of  an AU mission, although it was 
also partly a hybrid AU‑UN mission (Khadiagala, 2014). The SANDF launched Operation 
Cordite in July 2004 with the deployment of  staff  officers and military observers to Darfur, 
Sudan. This was in support of  the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and to supplement the 
existing Sudan deployment. An infantry protection company and an explosive ordnance 
disposal unit were also deployed. AMIS was terminated at the end of  2007 by the UN 
African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), becoming the first AU‑UN hybrid mission. The 
South African contingent remained in Darfur in support of  this hybrid mission, and 
the UN requested that South Africa increase the contingent to a standard UN Infantry 
Battalion‑size force in 2008. However, challenges regarding the infrastructure within the 
mission area made it impossible to comply. By 2012, the contingent totalled 760, including 
eight military observers and seven staff  officers. In assessing South Africa’s participation 
in the AU‑led mission, we can nevertheless conclude that ‘The mobilisation of  the AU 
Mission in Darfur failed to stem the genocide committed by the Sudanese government 
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of  Al‑Bashir against defenceless civilians seeking autonomy for the region’ (Khadiagala, 
2012:278). A full account of  South Africa’s participation, beyond the scope of  the present 
chapter, should include Thabo Mbeki’s diplomatic role on behalf  of  the AU/UN and 
the wider implications of  South Africa’s changing relationship with the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).
Central African Republic
South Africa’s involvement in CAR signalled a significant change in foreign policy. As has 
been noted above, foreign policy is shaped by the Presidency, and in the case of  President 
Zuma, there was a significant shift from the policies of  his predecessors. However, some 
argued that there was continuity in both personnel and the vision for an African Agenda 
in foreign policy (Habib (2009:143). While it is true that the African unity rhetoric 
continued to underpin foreign policy narratives, Khadiagala (2014:279) characterised the 
Zuma period as ‘muddling through’ rather than leadership, and criticised the economic 
diplomacy in Africa as leading to the ‘conflation of  national and party interests as ANC 
elites and Zuma’s family members joined in the scramble for economic opportunities’. 
It is in this context that one must try to understand the military deployment to CAR. 
According to some allegations, the CAR involvement may have partially been caused by 
business interests that included the Zuma family. While all of  the facts are not yet in 
the open, this may change with the initiation of  the Commission on State Capture on 
20 August 2018. What is known from a briefing by deputy Defence Minister Makwetla 
is that the original mission to CAR of  March 2007, Operation Vimbezela, was primarily 
comprised of  training and engineer personnel. This was in response to a request from 
the CAR for assistance with training and refurbishment of  training facilities. The 2007 
bilateral military agreement was signed by then President Mbeki and CAR’s president 
Francois Bozize, and was apparently renewed in December 2012 under Zuma’s rule, by 
which stage Bozize’s authoritarian rule was coming under significant pressure from the 
armed rebel coalition known as Seleka. For reasons that are not entirely clear, South 
Africa deployed an estimated 200 paratroopers during January 2013. What is clear is that 
the SANDF troops that were dispatched to CAR were not for training or infrastructure 
refurbishment, and that they were deployed with neither parliamentary approval, nor 
coordination with DIRCO (Römer Heitman, 2013). Along with this, neither the AU nor 
the SADC security organ were consulted.
The rationale of  the deployment of  forces to CAR remains opaque and thus speculative. 
We can dismiss the argument that there was a need to defend a national security interest 
or substantial economic interests, since CAR does not feature as a significant security or 
commercial partner (Khadiagala, 2014:279). Neither is the argument one based on historical 
ties, as the CAR leadership was not involved in the anti‑apartheid struggle. One reason 
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offered by Khadiagala is that South Africa’s pan‑Africanist credentials are strengthened 
by its involvement in French‑speaking Africa, but this view is in reference to Mbeki’s 
2007 bilateral agreement, not to Zuma’s unilateral adventurism. From the perspective of 
the Seleka rebels, who entered into power‑sharing negotiations with the Bozize govern‑
ment in January 2013, the South African troops were propping up the Bozize regime 
(Khadiagala, 2014:279). Seleka’s military offensive to capture Bangui in March 2013 resulted 
in 13 South African soldiers being killed, with 27 wounded and one missing in action. 
This ill‑fated involvement in CAR remains controversial. There was domestic criticism 
because the deployment happened with less parliamentary oversight than was necessary, 
and because there were inconsistencies in the explanations offered after the deployment 
ended in tragedy. Similarly, there was insufficient consultation within SADC, of  which 
CAR is not a member, and with the Economic Community of  Central African States 
(ECCAS), of  which CAR is a member. This failure of  domestic oversight of  defence 
diplomacy has led to media speculation that South African soldiers were deployed to CAR 
to protect mining companies with links to the ANC, and to protect the financial interests 
of  the Zuma family. 
While President Zuma maintained that those killed in Bangui ‘died in defence of  the 
country’s foreign policy’, there were considerable efforts to avoid full accountability 
(Khadiagala, 2014:285). Instead, Zuma was quoted as saying (Khadiagala, 2014:285): 
There must be an appreciation that matters of  military tactics and strategy are not 
to be discussed in public … No country reveals and discusses its military strategies 
in the manner that South Africa is expected to do. Those who are engaging in this 
game should be careful not to endanger both the national interest and the security 
of  the republic. 
However, an analysis by two professors of  Military Strategy at the South African Military 
Academy concluded that the CAR deployment is indicative of  the deep‑seated strategic 
failures of  South African military action on the continent (Vreÿ & Esterhuyse, 2016). 
Despite the CAR incident as a low point in South Africa’s defence diplomacy, expectations 
continue that South Africa should extend its role in the AU and through the APSA it 
helped to establish. Significant gains have been made in advancing South African interests 
through multilateral diplomacy, including in the continental security institutions, but 
caution is advised.
Defence diplomacy on the continent 
Under Mbeki’s diplomatic initiative between 1999 and 2002, South Africa played a key role 
in transforming the OAU into the AU. The AU’s Constitutive Act condemned genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and the AU thus has the right to intervene 
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against military coups and in defence of  human rights. With its creation in July 2002 came 
a framework for APSA, based on a collective security approach from a human security 
perspective (Hutchful, 2009). The AU’s 15‑member Peace and Security Council (PSC) is 
the most important African institution for the management of  peace and security issues, 
authorising peace operations and coordinating conflict management strategies (African 
Union, 2002). Since 2004, the AU has intended to build its capacity to respond to conflicts 
rapidly and effectively through the creation of  the African Standby Force (ASF), but 
while initially scheduled for operation by 2010, the delay in creating the ASF reveals the 
weaknesses of  Africa’s institutional capacity at the subregional level. 
In contrast, SADC declared its new regional military formation, the SADCBRIG, 
operational in August 2007 (Mandrup, 2009). South Africa was crucial, and described as 
‘very active in the formation of  the ASF, and SADCBRIG’, which was modelled on the 
Nordic Stand‑by High Readiness Brigade (Mandrup, 2009:18). South Africa’s ambitions 
were also evident at the AU itself: in 2012, South Africa aggressively campaigned for the 
candidacy of  Nkosazana Dlamini‑Zuma for the position of  AU Commission Chair. This 
was controversial as it went against the unwritten rule that no major African power should 
occupy this position. By May 2013, the AU Assembly established the African Capacity 
for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), based on individual African states deploying 
troops. South Africa strongly championed ACIRC, but key continental players such as 
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Kenya expressed reservations (Brosig & Sempijja, 2015:2‑3). 
Some argue that South Africa’s push for ACIRC diverted resources and political energy 
away from finalisation of  the ASF (Warner, 2015), while critical observers hold that the AU 
had been used as a tool of  South Africa’s foreign policy. Dlamini‑Zuma served only one 
four‑year term as Chair.
Conclusions and recommendations
South Africa’s involvement in Africa via its defence diplomacy aimed to show the country 
as a potential peace multiplier. However, as this role has expanded, both in terms of 
geography and complexity, new demands and expectations must be met with realism. 
On the one hand, South Africa’s diplomacy demonstrates a commitment to Africa, its 
people, and the continent. On the other hand, a lack of  reflection or poorly‑calculated 
pragmatism has introduced discrepancies. Despite South Africa’s appearance of  relative 
strength, there are real limitations that should be considered rationally before unrealistic 
demands or inflated expectations are uncritically accepted (Brooks, 2001; Nibishaka, 2011; 
Dube, 2013; Fabricius, 2013; Schuenemann & Cilliers, 2013). These are the fundamental 
issues that impact South Africa’s defence diplomacy.
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As we noted, the ‘new’ South Africa’s approach to conflict resolution on the continent 
and elsewhere was to advocate its own internal solution to other conflict‑ridden societies: 
that of  transition through negotiation and the attainment of  constitutional democracy. 
Promoting peace through advocating negotiated settlement was taken seriously, especially 
under Presidents Mandela and Mbeki, as South Africa’s diplomacy after 1994 moved 
from a militarist to a moralist approach in its external relations. The country’s foreign 
policy centred on the themes of  Africanism, promoting human rights and democracy, a 
holistic approach to security, pacific forms of  conflict resolution, and multilateralism. As 
Nathan (2005) points out, these five themes have value when they are mutually‑consistent, 
conceptually‑linked, and consolidated. 
Although Nathan (2005) was referring specifically to the early years of  the Mbeki 
presidency, he also identified significant contradictions. One such inconsistency was an 
absence of  common values in the region, which inhibited collective action and policy 
consensus. An example of  this disconnect between declared democratic commitments 
and foreign policy in action was the policy towards Zimbabwe. Far from being ‘quiet 
diplomacy’, Nathan (2005) shows South Africa’s foreign policy as expressing support for 
Mugabe, even in response to state repression and the undermining of  the rule of  law. This 
position on Zimbabwe was also inconsistent with South Africa’s stated holistic approach 
to human security. Nathan (2005) argued that South Africa’s foreign policy is constrained 
by deep political divisions in the region and in SADC, and this chapter demonstrates that 
this has had an impact on how the country carries out its defence diplomacy, and on the 
effectiveness of  such policy.
Relative to the region, South Africa has both a strong and vibrant economy and a capable 
military force. Expectations therefore run high for South Africa to be actively engaged in 
peace missions. Simultaneously, the country also has to guard against the perception of 
behaving as an imposing hegemon. It has also had to steer clear of  involvement with other 
international actors, such as the US, UK and France, that may be perceived as colonial 
or neo‑imperial powers. Yet the expectation that South Africa, as the regional power in 
SADC and one of  the significant powers in Africa, has to be more involved in a spectrum 
of  peace missions, including peace enforcement, persists (Tlhaole, 2013:13; Williams, 
2011:1). South Africa’s mission‑based approach, including peace‑support operations and 
defence diplomacy, must be seen as selective engagement, depending on force levels, 
capabilities and resources in support of  properly articulated foreign relations (Liebenberg 
& Mokoena, 2014:8). The challenge is to align expectations with real capabilities, or to 
align ends and means.
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South Africa is currently constrained by having a weak economy, limited capacity for 
external action, and a number of  domestic problems, including poor service delivery. Real 
limitations exist in the military too, such as the age profile of  SANDF staff, the levels of 
available skills, budgetary constraints, and the state of  readiness of  equipment, some of 
which was bought in the 1990s and is now not immediately deployable. These limitations 
should be kept in mind by political and military leadership, even if  South Africa has a 
coherent foreign policy. The challenge to be able to deliver effectively without promising 
too much requires a coherent long‑term national security strategy. A solid document on a 
National Security Strategy is required.
Once this national security strategy is properly articulated, South Africa’s defence 
diplomacy as an extension of  its foreign policy needs to focus on coordination with its 
partners. Aside from the greatest obstacle of  financing, coordination and leadership are 
huge challenges. States on the continent have different abilities and capabilities, and how 
to streamline coordination between the militaries of  states, regional organisations and 
the AU requires continuous attention. As Hughes argues, ‘some states must in practice 
come to take a greater initiative than others’ (2001:296), and South Africa would do well 
to work through the organisations it has been instrumental in creating: SADC and the 
regional organisations (West, East and in the Maghreb) within the continental realm (AU, 
ASF, APSA). Responsibilities should be shared and cooperation enhanced through task 
division that keeps in mind the asymmetric nature of  the economic power and relative 
influence of  African countries in the broader partnership. Future success will depend on 
how well‑coordinated, planned and executed operations will be, how cost‑effective within 
a set time‑frame, and to what extent states with differing economies in each region and on 
the continent can contribute to missions. 
A fundamental aspect, however, has to underpin all of  South Africa’s international action 
and that is its democratic status and respect for the constitutionally‑mandated rule of 
law. Effective civilian oversight is necessary, and political and military leaders must be 
held accountable for the availability of  funding, material capacity, human capacity, and 
skilled resources. There must be informed debate on the conditions for intervention: 
When to go and when not to go? Here, capacity, expectations, skills, and finances are of 
great importance, as timely, rather than reactive, intervention is necessary. Of  importance 
is that the decision for intervention be thoroughly agreed upon by all the actors. Force 
generation should match cooperation, consultation, entrance, and exit strategies. These 
are all factors that require military expertise but need to have civilian oversight. In this 
regard, the recent criticisms can be summarised as: (1) the undue influence of  the ruling 
party on political decision‑making, especially under Jacob Zuma; (2) the relatively low 
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levels of  participation by parliament; (3) the relative lack of  influence of  the Defence 
Secretariat (Fourie, 2012); and (4) the lack of  coordinated policymaking and development 
of  a long‑term vision for South Africa’s security position and engagements in the region 
and on the continent. Critical observers also point out that ‘parliament’s reactive rather 
than pro‑active foreign policy role has often been criticised’ (Van Wyk, 2012:279). 
Assuming that this is true, a lot of  work remains to ensure closer interaction between 
DIRCO, the Presidency, parliament, the Defence Secretariat (as a significant independent 
institution), and the DOD. As foreign policy impacts so closely on defence diplomacy, 
a more integrated approach is necessary, while civilian oversight is simultaneously 
strengthened. This is a necessary approach as the country combines its soft power and hard 
power capabilities. The challenges from earlier remain. If  South Africa oversteps the line 
between benevolent strong partner and imposing hegemon, some diplomatic gains will be 
lost and replaced with underlying tensions. On the other hand, if  the benevolent partner 
overstretches or over‑estimates its capacity, it may lead to loss of  face and diminished trust 
between continental actors. There are no easy choices here.
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